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Abstract 
Traditionally banks have used securitization for expanding credit and thus their profitability. 
It has been well documented that, at least before the 2008 crisis, many banks were keeping a 
high proportion of the securities that they created on their own balance-sheets. Those 
securities retained included both the high-risk ‘equity’ tranche and the low-risk AAA-rated 
tranche. This paper builds a simple model of securitization that accounts for the above 
retention strategies. Banks in the model retained the equity tranche as skin in the game in 
order to mitigate moral hazard concerns while they post the low-risk tranche as collateral in 
order to take advantage of the yield curve. When variations in loan quality are introduced the 
predicted retention strategies match well those found in empirical studies. 
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1. Introduction 
As time goes on banks rely less on deposits for financing their activities and more on 
securitization and leverage (Greenbaum and Thakor, 1987; Mester, 1992). These options for 
raising funds have allowed them to substantially expand their balance sheets and thus their 
profitability albeit, as the crisis of 2008 has made clear, at higher levels of risk exposure 
(Brunnermeier, 2009; Dell’Ariccia et al., 2009; Mian and Sufi, 2009). Securitization itself 
has also been the subject of financial innovation. Some of the securities are straight pass-
throughs as, for example, in the case of some types of loan sales (Pennacchi, 1988; Carlstrom 
and Samolyk, 1995; Gorton and Pennacchi, 1995) while other securities are created by 
pooling and tranching the cash-flows of banking assets.
1
 In the latter case, a variety of new 
securities are formed differentiated by their default risk and then sold to investors according 
to their risk appetite.  
The initial objective of securitization was to boost liquidity by enabling banks to sell 
their assets and use the funds raised from these sales to offer new loans. However, it has been 
well documented that, at least before the crisis, many banks were keeping a high proportion 
of the securities that they created on their own balance-sheets. What is more surprising is that 
those securities retained included both the high-risk ‘equity’ tranche (Acharya et al., 2009) 
and the low-risk AAA-rated tranche (Acharya and Schnabl, 2009).
2
 The same banks, 
especially those that are large and grow fast, have also increasingly relied on short-term 
wholesale financial markets for raising funds (Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga, 2010). 
In this paper, I provide a theoretical account for the above observations by introducing 
into the Shleifer and Vishny (2010) banking model a monitoring role for banks, similar to 
that in Holmström and Tirole (1997).
3
 In Shleifer and Vishny (2010) the form of contracts 
related to the sale of securities to investors and the form of contracts agreed between the bank 
and its lenders are both exogenously given. In particular, investors require the bank to keep 
on its books as ‘skin in the game’ a fixed fraction of the securities that it creates while lenders 
impose a ‘haircut’ on bank lending that is defined as the ratio of the size of the loan in 
                                                          
1
 This method of security creation has attracted an extensive literature reviewed by Gorton and Metrick (2013) 
who also provide a detail description of the institutional (including the legal) environment within which this 
process takes place. 
2
 Acharya and Schnabl (2009) report that if someone includes those AAA-rated asset backed securities that 
banks held off their balance-sheets in ABCP conduits and SIVs then the fraction retained rises above 50%. See 
also Jaffee et al. (2009) and Krishnamurthy (2008). 
3
 The purpose of contract design is to provide a solution to delegated monitoring, a problem previously analyzed 
by Diamond (1984), Ramakrishnan and Thakor (1984), Boyd and Prescott (1986) and Winton (2003). These 
papers are part of a very extensive literature that analyzes the role of banks as monitors; for a review see 
Bhattacharya and Thakor (1993). 
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relation to the value of the securities that the bank posts as collateral. By applying results 
derived in the literature within the context of a borrower-lender relationship to a delegated 
monitoring setting, I am able to derive the optimal contractual forms that the bank agrees 
with its investors and lenders. In particular, I demonstrate that, when the returns on the loans 
are not perfectly correlated, pooling and tranching of the cash-flows generated by the loans 
that the bank offers to its clients is optimal. In the context of the present model, where all 
parties are risk-neutral, the benefits of pooling are not the result of risk diversification. By 
keeping a fraction of the equity tranche on its books, the bank assures investors that it still has 
an incentive to monitor its clients. I further show that, when I allow for projects of different 
quality the skin in the game declines as quality improves. What the bank does with the AAA-
rated tranche depends on the relative cost of raising funds between selling these securities to 
investors and increasing its leverage by posting them as collateral. The model predicts that 
when the bank uses leverage to finance its activities it can reduce haircuts, and thus boost 
credit expansion, by posting as collateral securities that bear lower levels of risk.  
The model rationalizes the practices that for a long time banks have been using to 
expand their activities. However, the global financial crisis has made painfully clear that 
many institutions around the world that have adopted those practices only survived the crisis 
because of very expensive government bailouts. There is a very fast growing literature 
devoted not only to identifying the causes of the crisis but also to the design of appropriate 
policy responses.
4
 Along with lax monetary conditions, regulatory failure, underestimation of 
systemic risk, poor performance by rating agencies, and a weak banking governance 
structure, there are aspects of financial innovation that have also been regarded responsible 
for the financial crisis.
5
 But as the Federal Reserve chairman Ben Bernanke has suggested it 
is important to distinguish financial innovation from its implementation.
6
 Financial 
innovation can lead to new products that offer efficient solutions to agency problems in 
financial markets. In the model below, securitization by pooling and tranching of asset 
returns in conjunction with certain retention strategies ensure investors that the bank has a 
                                                          
4
 See for example Acharya and Richardson (2009) and Dewatripont et al. (2010) and the two symposia in the 
Journal of Economic Perspectives (Winter 2009, Winter 2010). 
5
 Gennaioli et al. (2012) have shown that when consumers neglect small probability risks financial innovation 
can indeed lead to higher financial market volatility. 
6
 The following quote is taken from his speech “Financial Innovation and Consumer Protection” that he 
delivered at the Federal Reserve System's Sixth Biennial Community Affairs Research Conference, Washington, 
D.C. in April, 2009: “…as we have seen only too clearly during the past two years, innovation that is 
inappropriately implemented can be positively harmful. In short, it would be unwise to try to stop financial 
innovation, but we must be more alert to its risks and the need to manage those risks properly.”  
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strong incentive to monitor its clients, thus, enabling it to expand its balance sheet and hence 
its profits. 
I develop the model in Section 3 and in the next two sections I focus on the case when 
all loan returns are perfectly correlated. In Section 4, I analyze credit expansion for the case 
when the bank creates straight pass-through securities while in Section 5 I derive the optimal 
form of securitization contracts. I show that by using tranching the bank can create (a)  high-
risk securities which, if they are kept on its books, enhance its incentive to monitor its clients, 
(b) very low-risk securities that can be posted as collateral, and (c) medium-risk securities 
that are sold to investors. In Section 6, I extend the analysis to the case where loan returns are 
independently distributed and show that incentives can be further improved by pooling, in 
addition to tranching, loan payoffs. By combining pooling and tranching the bank conditions 
security payoffs on the proportion of projects that succeed. The bank by keeping on its books 
the high-risk tranche that pays out only when a sufficiently high fraction of projects succeed 
has even stronger incentives to monitor its clients. In section 7, I allow for project quality 
variations and address issues related to the financial crisis. I conclude in Section 8.  
2. Related Literature 
One old method for tranching payoffs is their separation into seniority claims. The 
advantages of this practice for mechanism design have been the subject of a very long 
literature and the work that is most closely related to the present one is Innes (1990). In his 
model the lender cannot observe the level of effort exerted by the entrepreneur. Given that 
expected profits increase with effort, Innes (1990) shows that, if (a) the entrepreneur has 
limited liability, and (b) the loan repayment is restricted to be non-decreasing in profits, it is 
optimal for the lender to offer a standard-debt contract. Thus, the entrepreneur holds the risky 
equity tranche that pays out in states that become more likely as she exerts higher levels of 
effort. Similarly, in this model the bank’s incentives to monitor its clients are strongest when 
it holds the risky-equity tranche. Of course, the observation that financing loan sales using 
debt increases the bank’s incentives to monitor is not new.7 One of the contributions of the 
present paper is to show that pooling and tranching can at least partially implement the 
optimal mechanism when bank asset returns are not perfectly correlated.
8
  
 What drives the results in Innes (1990) and in the present work is the assumption that 
the return distribution conditional on the level of effort (monitoring) satisfies the monotone 
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 See, for example, Pennacchi (1988), Gorton and Pennacchi (1995) and Parlour and Plantin (2008). 
8
 Tirole (2006) has already shown that pooling and tranching of returns can improve incentives when the latter 
are not perfectly correlated but in this paper I further show the optimality of these arrangements.  
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likelihood ratio property (MLRP). When this property is satisfied the observation of high 
returns leads to the inference that they were drawn from a distribution corresponding to high 
levels of effort. The benefits of pooling and tranching have also been demonstrated for 
environments where the property is violated. In Chiesa (2008) banks perform a monitoring 
role similar to the one in this paper. When monitoring is most valuable in those states where 
the systemic risk is high (economic downturns) she finds that it is optimal for the bank to sell 
its entire portfolio to investors and in addition offer them the option to sell it back to the bank 
at a pre-specified price. In Fender and Mitchell (2009) banks, rather than monitoring their 
clients after the signing of contracts, they screen them in advance in order to separate those 
with high-quality projects from the rest.
9
 They restrict their analysis to two types of 
securitization, namely, straight pass-through securities (what they call ‘vertical slice’) and 
securities created by pooling and tranching. They find that when MLPR is violated pooling 
and tranching is the best option along with a retention strategy where the bank keeps 
medium-risk securities (mezzanine tranche) on its books. The contribution of this paper is 
that it analyses securitization within a mechanism design framework, albeit for a simpler 
environment where MLPR is satisfied. 
 The present paper is also related to a strand of the literature that analyses 
securitization within a signalling framework. In DeMarzo and Duffie (1999) the bank has 
superior information about the quality of the loans that attempts to sell to investors and it uses 
the size of the ‘skin in the game’ as signal. In particular, the skin of the game increases with 
quality indicating that the bank is willing to hold on its books better quality assets. In 
contrast, in the present model the ‘skin in the game’ provides incentives for banks to monitor 
the projects that they finance. When projects of different quality are introduced the skin in the 
game declines as quality improves. The evidence, which I review in Section 7, is very thin 
but it suggests that the relationship might be negative. Weak support for the signalling 
framework it is not entirely surprising given that banks rely extensively on rating agencies for 
quality certification. Finally, DeMarzo (2005) demonstrates the advantages of pooling and 
tranching for the case when the seller of securities is informed. In his model, the advantages 
                                                          
9
 The two approaches are quite similar. Under the supposition that the bank needs to screen a fixed number of 
potential customers in order to identify one with a high-quality project the two models become isomorphic. The 
screening model is more suitable for the case when the bank securitizes mortgages while the monitoring model 
fits better the case of collaterarized loan obligations (CLOs) structured by pooling a variety of assets that, more 
recently, have included business loans.  
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of pooling are due to the benefits of diversification. In this paper, I show that pooling can be 
optimal even in the absence of diversification concerns.
10
 
3. The Model 
There are four types of risk-neutral agents in the model: entrepreneurs who need 
funds to finance projects, banks which provide funds to entrepreneurs and then use the loans 
to create securities, investors who buy the securities and lenders who offer loans to the banks 
accepting as collateral securities that banks keep on their books. I would like to use the model 
to understand not only the contractual arrangements between the banks and the other agents 
but also the process of credit expansion allowed by these arrangements. Then, it will be 
convenient to analyze an environment where the period of credit expansion is relatively short 
in comparison to the duration period of projects. With that in mind, I consider a model with 
three dates: 0, 1 and T. All contracts are agreed during the period between dates 0 and 1 and 
all projects financed during this initial period mature at T.
11
 The risk-free interest rate is equal 
to zero. 
[Please insert Figure 1 about here] 
3.1. Projects 
All projects are identical and require an investment of one unit of the single good in 
the economy. Projects can either succeed in which case they yield pledgeable income 𝑅𝐻 or 
fail in which case they yield pledgeable income 𝑅𝐿, where 𝑅𝐻 > 1 > 𝑅𝐿. The probability of 
success of a project depends on the behaviour of its owner (entrepreneur) who can either 
choose to exert effort or shirk. In the former case the probability of success is equal to 𝑝ℎ 
while in the latter case the probability of success is equal to 𝑝𝑙, where 𝑝ℎ > 𝑝𝑙. 
12
The returns 
of all projects are perfectly correlated. 
3.2. Banks 
In modelling banks I follow closely Shleifer and Vishny (2010). The objective of 
banks is to maximize the value of final equity. Given that financial markets are competitive, 
bank’s profit equals the revenues from the up-front fees that it collects when it finances new 
                                                          
10
 The advantages of tranching are also considered by Riddiough (1997). He considers the securitization of a 
single loan and therefore there is no pooling. In contrast, Glaeser and Kallal (1997) consider the advantages of 
pooling but allow for only pass-through securities. 
11
 Between dates 0 and 1 transactions take place sequentially and therefore in a fully fledged general equilibrium 
model the pricing of securities would be affected by discounting. As long as this period is very short in relation 
to the duration of the contracts ignoring the effect of discounting on prices is inconsequential for our results.  
12
 Clearly MLPR is satisfied given that project success is more likely when the entrepreneur exerts higher effort.  
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projects.
13
 Thus, the above objective is equivalent to maximizing the number of projects that 
banks finance.  
By monitoring a project at a cost 𝑚 a bank can ensure that its entrepreneur exerts 
effort. If a bank decides to finance a project it collects the up-front fee 𝑓 and an expected 
repayment of 1 + 𝑚 at date T. The following condition ensures that a project will only be 
financed when its entrepreneur exerts effort: 
𝑝𝑙𝑅𝐻 + (1 − 𝑝𝑙)𝑅𝐿 < 1 < 𝑝ℎ𝑅𝐻 + (1 − 𝑝ℎ)𝑅𝐿 − 𝑚.              (C1) 
The first inequality states that if the bank does not monitor the project the expected value of 
the pledgeable income would be less than the size of the loan. The second inequality states 
that when the bank monitors there is enough pledgeable income to cover both the size of the 
loan and the monitoring cost. Banks offer entrepreneurs debt contracts. Let 𝑉 denote the 
repayment when the project succeeds. The loan repayment must satisfy the condition 
(1 − 𝑝ℎ)𝑅𝑙 + 𝑝ℎ𝑉 = 1 + 𝑚 where the bank collects the whole payoff when the project fails. 
Solving for the repayment it yields 
 𝑉 =
1+𝑚−(1−𝑝ℎ)𝑅𝑙
𝑝ℎ
.          (1) 
3.3. Credit Expansion without Securitization 
Let 𝐸0 denote a bank’s equity at date 0. The bank will be able to fund 
𝐸0
1+𝑚
 projects 
and given that the only profits that the bank earns are due to the up-front fees it collects, the 
bank’s expected final equity is given by 𝐸𝑇 = 𝐸0 (1 +
𝑓
1+𝑚
).  
4. Fractional Securitization and Leverage 
In this section, I am going to expand the activities of banks by allowing them to 
securitize their loans. Through securitization banks will be able to expand credit, and thus 
profits, by selling a fraction of each security to the market. In addition, I will allow banks to 
post those securities that they keep on their books as collateral so that they can obtain loans 
                                                          
13
 The underlying assumption, as in Shleifer and Vishny (2010, p.309), is that these fees are distributed to 
shareholders as dividends. The need for introducing these fees is because under perfectly competitive markets 
banks make zero profits and therefore should be indifferent between alternative securitization methods. By 
introducing fee revenues that are proportional to bank lending the preferred securitization method is the one that 
maximizes credit expansion. The fees can be rationalizes as follows. Under the assumption that each bank offers 
a slightly differentiated product, this would be, for example, because they have an expertise in a particular type 
of lending related either to a location or to a sector of the economy, then under monopolistic competition each 
bank’s profits would be equal to a constant mark-up over its costs. In this model the fee reflects the mark-up. 
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from the market. Before I examine securitization and leverage together, I will analyze each 
one separately. 
4.1. Fractional Securitization without Leverage 
Securitization involves the sale in the market of cash flow claims associated with loan 
repayments. The contact between the buyers and the bank must be designed so that the bank 
still has an incentive to monitor its clients. It is clear, that if a buyer were to buy an entire 
loan, that is its total payoffs in both states, the bank would not have an incentive to monitor 
the loan. But then (C1) implies that the price the buyer would be willing to pay for the loan is 
less than one, which is an offer that the bank would refuse given that it had lent one unit to 
the entrepreneur. This argument suggests that the bank must keep part of the payoffs of each 
loan on its books for a sale to take place. Let the bank keep a fraction 𝑑, known as ‘skin in 
the game’, of each loan on its books. Thus, the buyer has a claim on a fraction 1 − 𝑑 of the 
payoff for each loan that she buys a share.
14
 Competition among buyers ensures that the 
equilibrium price the buyer’s share is equal to (1 − 𝑑)(1 + 𝑚). Clearly, the lower the ‘skin 
in the game’ is the higher will be credit expansion and thus the higher the value of the bank’s 
final equity. 
Proposition 1: Suppose that the bank can expand its activities by using only fractional 
securitization. The optimal value of the skin in the game is given by 
 𝑑𝐹 =
𝑚 
1−𝜌+𝑚
.                      (2) 
 The bank’s expected final equity under fractional securitization is given by 
 𝐸𝑇
𝐹 = 𝐸0 (1 +
𝑓
𝑑𝐹
1
1+𝑚
).         (3) 
 Proof: If the bank monitors the loan then it will earn a net payoff equal to 𝑓. If the bank does 
not monitor the loan then it will earn a net payoff equal to 𝑓 + 𝑑[(1 − 𝑝𝑙 )𝑅𝐿 + 𝑝𝑙𝑉] +
(1 − 𝑑)(1 + 𝑚) − 1. The second term is equal to the bank’s payoff from the fraction of the 
loan that it kept on its books, the third term is equal to its revenues from the sale of the rest of 
the loan and the last term is equal to its initial investment. Comparing the two net payoffs 
shows that the bank will monitor the loan if the following incentive compatibility holds: 
 𝑑 ≥
𝑚 
1−𝜌+𝑚
, where 𝜌 ≡ (1 − 𝑝𝑙)𝑅𝐿+𝑝𝑙 𝑉.              (IC1) 
                                                          
14
 Without any loss of generality, I assume that the number of securities that the bank creates equals the number 
of projects it finances. 
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𝜌 is equal to the expected payoff of the loan given that bank does not monitor. The bank’s 
incentive to monitor the project decreases with 𝜌 and the size of monitoring costs. Thus, the 
skin in the game is increasing in both of these variables. The incentive compatibility 
constraint defines all values for 𝑑 that offer incentives for the bank to monitor. Among those 
values the bank will choose the one that maximizes its expected final equity. A bank with 
equity 𝐸0 at date 0 initially provides 
𝐸0
1+𝑚
 loans. From the first round of securitization receives 
revenues (1 − 𝑑)𝐸0 and provides (1 − 𝑑
𝐹)
𝐸0
1+𝑚
 additional loans. Repeating the process the 
bank by date 1 will provide in total 
𝐸0
1+𝑚
∑ (1 − 𝑑)𝜏∞𝜏=0 =
1
𝑑𝐹
𝐸0
1+𝑚
 loans. Given that the bank’s 
profits come from the fees it collects, these profits are proportional to the number of loans it 
provides and thus in equilibrium the incentive compatibility constraint will bind.   □ 
4.2. Leverage without Securitization 
Banks can borrow funds from the market, and thus expand credit, by posting 
securities that they keep in their books as collateral. I assume that potential lenders offer to 
banks only secured loans. This, for example, will be the case if it is too costly for them to 
verify the bank’s stochastic payoffs. In this section, I do not allow the bank to sell to the 
market any of the securities that it creates but keeps them on its books. Once more, I consider 
a bank that at date 0 has equity 𝐸0. 
Proposition 2: Suppose that the bank can expand its activities by using only leverage. The 
optimal value of the haircut is given by 
 ℎ =
1+𝑚−𝑅𝐿
1+𝑚
.           (4) 
 The bank’s expected final equity under leverage is given by 
 𝐸𝑇
𝐿 = 𝐸0 (1 +
𝑓
ℎ
1
1+𝑚
).         (5) 
Proof:  The bank will initially finance, and thus securitize, 
𝐸0 
1+𝑚
 loans. Given that (a) the 
returns of all loans are perfectly correlated, and (b) the bank raises funds in a competitive 
market, the collateral value of these initial loans, and thus the amount the bank can borrow, is 
equal to 
𝐸0 
1+𝑚
𝑅𝐿. With the new funds the bank can finance 
𝐸0 
(1+𝑚)2 
𝑅𝐿 additional loans which 
can also be used as collateral. The process repeats itself ad infinitum. The bank by date 1 will 
have in total created 
𝐸0 
1+𝑚
∑ (
𝑅𝐿
1+𝑚
)
𝜏
=∞𝜏=0
𝐸0 
1+𝑚−𝑅𝐿
 loans. The competitive market value of each 
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security is equal to 1 + 𝑚. The collateral value of the same security is equal to 𝑅𝐿. The ratio 
ℎ ≡
1+𝑚−𝑅𝐿
1+𝑚
, that is the ratio of the difference between market value and collateral value to 
market value, is known as the ‘haircut’.        □ 
Notice, that given that the loans are secured, lenders do not care about whether the bank 
monitors its clients. Having said that, as the bank keeps all the loans on its books and, 
moreover, only receives a payoff when the loans succeed, it has an even stronger incentive to 
monitor relative to the case when it does not lever its equity.
  
  
4.3. Fractional Securitization with Leverage 
Now, I will allow the bank to engage in both fund raising activities. It can sell 
securities in the market and borrow funds by posting as collateral those securities it holds on 
its books. The bank is not allowed to sell any securities that it has already posted as collateral 
for a loan unless it does so to repay the loan. However, the bank is allowed to post as 
collateral securities that keeps in it books as skin in the game. 
Proposition 3: Suppose that the bank can expand its activities by using both fractional 
securitization and leverage. The optimal value of the skin in the game is given by  
 𝑑𝐹𝐿 ≡
𝑚 
(𝑝ℎ−𝑝𝑙)𝑉 
< 𝑑𝐹.          (6) 
The bank’s expected final equity is given by 
 𝐸𝑇
𝐹𝐿 = 𝐸0 (1 +
𝑓
𝑑𝐹𝐿ℎ
1
1+𝑚
).         (7) 
Proof: I begin by showing that the buyers of securities set the skin in the game lower when 
the bank posts the corresponding securities as collateral. The bank’s net gain by not 
monitoring a loan is equal to 𝑚 − 𝑑(𝑝ℎ − 𝑝𝑙 ) 𝑉. Given that the bank is posting the security 
created from the loan as collateral it will earn a payoff only when the corresponding project 
succeeds. Then, the bank will monitor the loan if the following incentive compatibility 
constraint holds: 
 𝑑 ≥
𝑚
(𝑝ℎ−𝑝𝑙)𝑉
.                  (IC2) 
Given that the bank’s profits are increasing with credit expansion, the incentive compatibility 
constraint binds in equilibrium. To complete the proof of the first part of the Proposition, use 
(1) to substitute for 𝑉 in (6) and then subtract it from (2). 
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Next, I examine the level of credit expansion when the bank uses both securitization 
and leverage to finance its activities. Recall that the bank cannot sell any securities that it has 
already posted as collateral and that a bank with equity 𝐸0 at date 0 will initially finance 
𝐸0 
1+𝑚
 
projects and create the same number of securities. The bank will keep a fraction 𝑑𝐹𝐿 of these 
securities as skin in the game and also post them as collateral in order to borrow from the 
market. Thus, the bank will be able to borrow 𝑑𝐹𝐿
𝐸0 
1+𝑚
𝑅𝐿 from lenders and receive (1 −
𝑑𝐹𝐿)𝐸0 from the sale of securities. The bank can now use the revenues from the sale of 
securities and the amount borrowed from the market to finance (1 − 𝑑𝐹𝐿)
𝐸0 
1+𝑚
+
𝑑𝐹𝐿
𝐸0 
(1+𝑚)2
𝑅𝐿new projects. The bank will repeat the process by keeping a fraction 𝑑
𝐹𝐿 of the 
new loans as skin in the game and at the same time posting them as collateral to finance 
2𝑑𝐹𝐿(1 − 𝑑𝐹𝐿)
𝐸0 
(1+𝑚)2
𝑅𝐿 + (1 − 𝑑
𝐹𝐿)2
𝐸0 
1+𝑚
+ (𝑑𝐹𝐿)2
𝐸0 
(1+𝑚)3
(𝑅𝐿)
2 =
𝐸0 
1+𝑚
((1 − 𝑑𝐹𝐿) +
𝑑𝐹𝐿
1 
1+𝑚
𝑅𝐿)
2
 additional projects. By repeating the process ad infinitum the bank by date 1 
will have created in total 
𝐸0 
1+𝑚
∑ ((1 − 𝑑𝐹𝐿) + 𝑑𝐹𝐿
1 
1+𝑚
𝑅𝐿)
𝜏
∞
𝜏=0 =
1
𝑑𝐹𝐿(1−
𝑅𝐿
1+𝑚
)
=
1
𝑑𝐹𝐿ℎ
 new 
loans.             □ 
Since the bank earns a payoff only when the project succeeds it has a stronger incentive to 
monitor and thus the buyers respond by asking for a lower skin in the game.  
5. Optimal Securitization Contracts 
Up to this point, I have assumed that when a bank sells securities it keeps a share 𝑑 of 
each security on its books and, thus, it receives a fraction 𝑑 of its payoffs in each state of the 
world. Now, I will demonstrate how a bank can further boost credit expansion, and thus 
increase its profits, by choosing an alternative way to split the payoffs of the projects.  
5.1. Optimal Securitization Contracts without Leverage 
For the moment, I will ignore leverage which I will reconsider in the following 
section. Suppose that the bank creates two securities out of each loan. The first security, 
which I denote  𝑋𝐵, will pay off 𝑧𝐻 if the project succeeds and 𝑧𝐿 if the project fails and the 
bank keeps it on its books. The second security, which I denote 𝑋𝐼, will pay off 𝑉 − 𝑧𝐻 if the 
project succeeds and 𝑅𝐿 − 𝑧𝐿 if the project fails and the bank sells it to investors.  
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Fractional securitization imposes the additional constraint 
𝑧𝐻
𝑉
=
𝑧𝐿
𝑅𝐿
. This means it 
allows only equity contracts.  Now I relax this constraint. We can  define as skin in the game 
the ratio of the bank’s expected payoff from each loan to the total expected payoff of the 
loan, even if the payoffs to the two securities created from a loan are not proportional to their 
shares of equity in the loan. 
Proposition 4: Suppose that project returns are perfectly correlated. The optimal value of the 
skin in the game under optimal securitization but without leverage is given by     
 𝑑𝑆 =
𝑝ℎ𝑚
(𝑝ℎ−𝑝𝑙)(1+𝑚)
.          (8) 
The bank’s expected final equity under optimal securitization but without leverage is given by 
 𝐸𝑇
𝑆 = 𝐸0 (1 +
𝑓
𝑑𝑆
1
1+𝑚
).         (9) 
Proof: If the bank monitors the loan, its payoff will be equal to 𝑝ℎ𝑧𝐻 + (1 − 𝑝ℎ)𝑧𝐿 − 𝑚 and 
if it does not monitor the loan its payoff will be equal to 𝑝𝑙𝑧𝐻 + (1 − 𝑝𝑙)𝑧𝐿. The bank’s 
incentives to monitor increase with 𝑧𝐻 and decline with 𝑧𝐿. Then optimality requires: 
 𝑧𝐿 = 0 and 𝑧𝐻 =
𝑚
𝑝ℎ−𝑝𝑙
.                   (10) 
Next, I consider credit expansion for a bank with equity at date 0 equal to 𝐸0 that it 
has initially used to finance 
𝐸0
1+𝑚
 projects. The bank will create 
𝐸0
1+𝑚
 securities of type 𝑋𝐵 that 
will keep on its books and 
𝐸0
1+𝑚
 securities of type 𝑋𝐼 that will sell to investors (thus 
completely allocating the payoffs of the loans), raising revenues 𝑃𝑆
𝐸0
1+𝑚
, where 𝑃𝑆 denotes 
the price of a type 𝑋𝐼 security. With these revenues the bank will be able to finance 𝑃
𝑆 𝐸0 
(1+𝑚)2
 
additional loans and eventually 
𝐸0
1+𝑚
(
1
1−
𝑃𝑆
1+𝑚
) loans in total.  
To complete the proof of the proposition I need to derive 𝑃𝑆 and  𝑑𝑆. From the 
solution for 𝑧𝐻 it follows that the bank’s expected payoff from each security of type 𝑋𝐵 is 
equal to 
𝑝ℎ𝑚
(𝑝ℎ−𝑝𝑙)
. 𝑑𝑆 is obtained by dividing the last expression by each loan’s expected 
payoff, equal to 1 + 𝑚. Finally, the equilibrium price of a security of type 𝑋𝐼 is equal to the 
difference between these two payoffs that is  
 𝑃𝑆 = 1 + 𝑚 −
𝑝ℎ𝑚
(𝑝ℎ−𝑝𝑙)
.                   (11) 
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To derive the final equity substitute (11) in the expression derived above for the total number 
of loans.           □ 
The following proposition compares fractional with optimal securitization. 
Proposition 5: (a) 𝑑𝐹𝐿ℎ > 𝑑𝑆, and (b) 𝐸𝑇
𝑆 − 𝐸𝑇
𝐹𝐿 > 0. 
Proof: (a) Substituting for 𝑉 in the expression for 𝑑𝐹𝐿 given by (6) and multiplying by ℎ 
given by (4) yields (
𝑝ℎ𝑚
(𝑝ℎ−𝑝𝑙)(1+𝑚)−(1−𝑝ℎ)𝑅𝐿
) (
1+𝑚−𝑅𝐿
1+𝑚
) which can be shown to be greater than 
𝑝ℎ𝑚
(𝑝ℎ−𝑝𝑙)(1+𝑚)
= 𝑑𝑆. Part (b) follows after comparing (7) and (9) and noticing that the 
difference between the two expressions depends only on the two skins in the game. □ 
The split of payoffs under optimal securitization, by enhancing the bank’s incentives to 
monitor, lowers the skin in the game and thus boosts credit expansion. 
5.2. Optimal Securitization with Leverage 
The split of payoffs examined in the previous section does not allow the bank to lever 
its equity. The 𝑋𝐵 security that the bank keeps on its books has a zero payoff when the project 
fails and, given that the returns of all projects are perfectly correlated, it has zero collateral 
value. However, there is an alternative way of splitting the payoffs that would allow the bank 
to borrow from the market.  
The bank can do three things with the securities that it creates. It can sell them or keep 
them on its books and post them as collateral or keep them on its books without posting them 
as collateral. Furthermore, as the collateral value of any security is equal to its minimum 
payoff between the two states of the world it will be optimal for the bank to post as collateral 
securities that offer the same payoff in the two states. Therefore, there are potentially five 
types of securities that the bank might want to issue.
15
 However, as I demonstrated in the 
previous section, it is never optimal for the bank to issue securities that pay off only when the 
project fails and keep them on its books. This is because these types of securities reduce the 
bank’s incentive to monitor and would only keep them on its books if it can post them as 
collateral. It follows that there are only four types of securities that we need to consider. 
The first security, which I denote 𝑌𝐶 the bank keeps it on its books to post it as 
collateral and pays off ?̅? in both states of the. The second security, which I denote 𝑌𝐼
𝐿, is sold 
to investors and pays off 𝑅𝐿 − ?̅? only when the project fails The third security, which I 
denote 𝑌𝐵
𝐻, the bank keeps it on its books and pays off 𝑣𝐻 only when the project succeeds. 
                                                          
15
 I exclude the possibility of securities with lotteries as state-contingent payoffs. 
14 
 
The fourth security, which I denote 𝑌𝐼
𝐻, is sold to investors and pays off 𝑉 − 𝑣𝐻 − ?̅? only 
when the project succeeds. The following proposition states the main result. 
Proposition 6: Suppose that project returns are perfectly correlated. The bank’s expected 
final equity under optimal securitization  
 𝐸𝑇
𝑆𝐿 = 𝐸𝑇
𝑆 = 𝐸0 (1 +
𝑓
𝑝ℎ𝑚
(𝑝ℎ−𝑝𝑙)(1+𝑚)
1
1+𝑚
) = 𝐸0 (1 +
𝑓
𝑑𝑆
1
1+𝑚
),                        (12)   
is independent of its level of leverage.  
Proof:  If the bank monitors the loan, its payoff will be equal to 𝑝ℎ𝑣𝐻 − 𝑚 and if it does not 
monitor the loan its payoff will be equal to 𝑝𝑙𝑣𝐻. Keep in mind that when the project 
succeeds the bank has to repay ?̅? to its lenders. The bank’s incentive to monitor increases 
with 𝑣𝐻 but its ability to expand credit decreases with 𝑣𝐻 and increases with ?̅?. Thus, 
optimality requires: 
 ?̅? = 𝑅𝐿 and 𝑣𝐻 =
𝑚
𝑝ℎ−𝑝𝑙
,                  (13)  
The bank’s credit expansion ability is given by  
𝐶𝑆 = 𝑅𝐿 + 𝑝ℎ (𝑉 −
𝑚
𝑝ℎ−𝑝𝑙
− 𝑅𝐿) = 1 + 𝑚 −
𝑝ℎ𝑚
𝑝ℎ−𝑝𝑙
.              (14) 
The first term is equal to the amount borrowed by posting security 𝑌𝐶 as collateral. The 
second term is equal to the price of security 𝑌𝐼
𝐻 and thus is equal to the revenues received by 
selling it to investors.
16
  
Therefore, a bank with equity at date 0 equal to 𝐸0 that it has used to finance 
𝐸0
1+𝑚
 
projects will receive 
𝐸0
1+𝑚
(1 + 𝑚 −
𝑝ℎ𝑚
𝑝ℎ−𝑝𝑙
) from lenders and investors. With these funds the 
bank will be able to finance  
𝐸0
1+𝑚
(1 −
𝑝ℎ
1+𝑚
𝑚
𝑝ℎ−𝑝𝑙
) additional projects. Repeating the process 
ad infinitum the bank will, by date 1, have created in total 
𝐸0
1+𝑚
∑ (1 −
𝑝ℎ
1+𝑚
𝑚
𝑝ℎ−𝑝𝑙
)
𝜏
=∞𝜏=0
𝐸0
1+𝑚
1
𝑝ℎ𝑚
(𝑝ℎ−𝑝𝑙)(1+𝑚)
 loans.      □ 
Under the optimal securitization arrangement the bank does not derive any additional benefits 
by borrowing from the market. This result is the securitization version of the Modigliani-
Miller theorem. The bank can either sell the safe securities or post them as collateral. Given 
that, in the model, the required rate of return of investors and lenders is identical the bank is 
                                                          
16
 Security 𝑌𝐵
𝐻  does not show up as the bank keeps it on its books.  
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indifferent as to how it finances its activities. In practice, banks have been financing a great 
deal of activity by borrowing.  
6. Independently Distributed Project Returns, Pooling and Tranching 
Up to this point, I have focused on the case where all project returns are perfectly 
correlated. In this section, I relax this assumption. The distribution of returns of each project 
is exactly the same as before. However, these returns are now independently distributed. To 
keep things simple, I assume that there are two types of projects, namely type 𝐼 and type 𝐼𝐼 
and four states of the world and that half of the projects in the bank’s portfolio are type 𝐼 
while the other half of the projects are type 𝐼𝐼. The returns to projects of the same type are 
perfectly correlated. I assume that project types are observable and thus I eliminate any 
adverse selection considerations from the security design problem. The following table shows 
the distribution of returns:
17
 
[Please insert Table 1 about here] 
Given that the returns of projects of the same type are perfectly correlated, without any loss 
of generality, I assume that if the bank monitors a project it also monitors all other projects of 
the same type. Then, I consider the securitization of a portfolio created from two projects, one 
of each type. I also consider the case where the bank is able to post as collateral the securities 
that it keeps on its books.  
I will divide the analysis of rest of this section into two parts. I will begin by 
considering the case of optimal securitization without pooling and tranching. Then, I will 
introduce these possibilities and by comparing the two cases make the benefits of pooling and 
tranching clear. 
6.1. Securitization without Pooling and Tranching 
Following the analysis in the last section, the bank can potentially issue the following 
types of securities. Security 𝑌𝐶(𝑖), where 𝑖 = 𝐼, 𝐼𝐼, will pay off ?̅?(𝑖) in all states of the world 
and the bank will keep it on its books and post it as collateral. Security 𝑌𝐼
𝐿(𝑖) will be sold to 
investors and pays off 𝑅𝐿 − ?̅?(𝑖) only when the project fails. Security 𝑌𝐵
𝐻(𝑖) is kept on the 
bank’s books and pays off 𝑣𝐻(𝑖) only when the project succeeds. Security 𝑌𝐼
𝐻(𝑖) is sold to 
investors and  pays off 𝑉 − 𝑣𝐻(𝑖) − ?̅?(𝑖) only when the project succeeds. 
                                                          
17
 Notice that states I and II are distinct equally probable states.  
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After the bank signs an agreement with the investors it has three choices. It can 
monitor both projects or it can monitor only one project or it will not monitor either of the 
two projects. If the bank monitors both loans its payoff will be equal to ((𝑝ℎ)
2 +
𝑝ℎ(1 − 𝑝ℎ))(𝑣𝐻(𝐼) + 𝑣𝐻(𝐼𝐼)) − 2𝑚, keeping in mind that the bank receives a payoff only 
when a project succeeds. If the bank monitors only the type 𝐼 project its payoff will be equal 
to (𝑝ℎ𝑝𝑙)(𝑣𝐻(𝐼) + 𝑣𝐻(𝐼𝐼)) + 𝑝ℎ(1 − 𝑝𝑙)𝑣𝐻(𝐼) + 𝑝𝑙(1 − 𝑝ℎ)𝑣𝐻(𝐼𝐼) − 𝑚 and if the bank 
monitors only the type 𝐼𝐼 project its payoff will be equal to (𝑝ℎ𝑝𝑙)(𝑣𝐻(𝐼) + 𝑣𝐻(𝐼𝐼)) +
𝑝ℎ(1 − 𝑝𝑙)𝑣𝐻(𝐼𝐼) + 𝑝𝑙(1 − 𝑝ℎ)𝑣𝐻(𝐼) − 𝑚. Lastly, if the bank does not monitor any project 
its payoff will be equal to ((𝑝𝑙)
2 + 𝑝𝑙(1 − 𝑝𝑙))(𝑣𝐻(𝐼) + 𝑣𝐻(𝐼𝐼)).  
Given that ?̅?(𝐼) and ?̅?(𝐼𝐼) do not appear in the above payoffs it is optimal to set them 
equal to 𝑅𝐿 so that credit expansion is maximized. It is also optimal to set 𝑣𝐻(𝐼) = 𝑣𝐻(𝐼𝐼) =
𝑣𝐻. To see this suppose that 𝑣𝐻(𝐼) > 𝑣𝐻(𝐼𝐼). In this case the bank’s payoff is greater when it 
only monitors the type 𝐼 project than when it only monitors the type 𝐼𝐼 project. Then it is only 
the former payoff that matters for incentives. By decreasing 𝑣𝐻(𝐼) by 𝛿 and increasing 
𝑣𝐻(𝐼𝐼) by 𝛿
𝑝ℎ(1−𝑝𝑙)
𝑝𝑙(1−𝑝ℎ)
 that payoff remains the same but the corresponding incentive 
compatibility constraint would be relaxed. A similar argument eliminates 𝑣𝐻(𝐼) < 𝑣𝐻(𝐼𝐼). 
The discussion above implies that the optimal arrangement must satisfy the following 
incentive compatibility constraints: 
 ((𝑝ℎ)
2 + 𝑝ℎ(1 − 𝑝ℎ))2𝑣𝐻 ≥ (𝑝ℎ𝑝𝑙)2?̂?𝐻 + (𝑝ℎ(1 − 𝑝𝑙) + 𝑝𝑙(1 − 𝑝ℎ))𝑣𝐻 + 𝑚  
and 
 ((𝑝ℎ)
2 + 𝑝ℎ(1 − 𝑝ℎ))2𝑣𝐻 ≥ ((𝑝𝑙)
2 + 𝑝𝑙(1 − 𝑝𝑙))2𝑣𝐻 + 2𝑚. 
It is straightforward to show that each of the two constraints implies that 𝑣𝐻 ≥
𝑚
𝑝ℎ−𝑝𝑙
. The two 
constraints are identical as both the benefits and the costs are doubled when the bank decides 
not to monitor at all rather than monitoring only one of the projects.  
The solution derived above is the same as the one obtained for the case of perfect 
correlation. This is because the incentives for monitoring are designed at the project level and 
therefore the degree of correlation of project returns does not affect the design.  
6.2. Securitization with Pooling and Tranching 
In this section, I show how the bank can further boost credit expansion through the 
creation of new types of securities designed by pooling and tranching the payoffs of the loans 
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on its balance sheet. Although these additional benefits are only possible when the project 
returns are not perfectly correlated they are not the result of diversification as all agents are 
risk neutral. The analysis in this section proceeds in two steps. I will begin by characterizing 
the optimal pooling and tranching arrangement, that is among all possible pooling and 
tranching contracts I will choose the one that maximizes the bank’s final equity (credit 
expansion). Then I will demonstrate the optimality of pooling and tranching. In other words, I 
will demonstrate that any securitization contract that maximizes the bank’s final equity must 
involve pooling and tranching.  
The bank will issue four types of securities. The following table shows their state-
contingent payoffs.  
[Please insert Table 2 about here] 
Security 𝑊𝐶
0 is riskless having a payoff equal to 2𝑅𝐿 in every state of the world. Therefore, 
this security is created by pooling together the two 𝑌𝐶(𝑖) securities discussed in the previous 
section. This security is either posted as collateral or is sold to investors. 𝑊𝐼
𝐿 is a low-risk 
security that has a payoff equal to zero in state 𝐿 and a payoff equal to 𝑉 − 𝑅𝐿 in all other 
states. The security is created by pooling the payoffs of the two loans in states 𝐼 and 𝐼𝐼 and 
half the payoff of the two loans in state 𝐻 after subtracting first the payoff of security 𝑊𝐶
0. 
This security is sold to investors. The other two securities are high-risk and they only offer a 
positive payoff in state 𝐻. Security 𝑊𝐼
𝐻 is sold to investors and has a payoff equal to 𝑉 −
𝑤𝐻 − 𝑅𝐿 while security 𝑊𝐵
𝐻 has a payoff equal to 𝑤𝐻 and the bank keeps it on its books. 
Thus, there are three ‘tranches’: a riskless ‘tranche’ (security 𝑊𝐶
0), a low-risk tranche 
(security 𝑊𝐼
𝐿) and a high-risk tranche (securities 𝑊𝐼
𝐻 and 𝑊𝐵
𝐻).  
Proposition 7: Suppose that project returns are independently distributed. The bank’s 
expected final equity under pooling and tranching is given by: 
 𝐸𝑇
𝑃𝑇 = 𝐸0 (1 +
𝑓
(𝑝ℎ)
2
𝑚
((𝑝ℎ)
2
−(𝑝𝑙)
2
)(1+𝑚)
1
1+𝑚
) = 𝐸0 (1 +
𝑓
𝑑𝑃𝑇
1
1+𝑚
).                        (15) 
Proof: If the bank monitors the two loans its net payoff will be equal to (𝑝ℎ)
2𝑤𝐻 − 2𝑚 and if 
it does not monitor the two loans its net payoff will be equal to (𝑝𝑙)
2𝑤𝐻. Given that the 
bank’s credit expansion ability is decreasing with 𝑤𝐻, optimality requires that: 
 𝑤𝐻 =
2𝑚
(𝑝ℎ)2−(𝑝𝑙)2
.                    (16) 
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It is crucial that the payoff of security 𝑊𝐼
𝐿 in state 𝐻 is created by pooling and halving the 
payoffs of the two loans in that state. The same payoff can be created by separating the 
payoffs of the two loans but in that case the bank would not have an incentive to monitor the 
loan that is not on its books. To complete the argument, I need to show that with pooling the 
bank does not have an incentive to monitor only one loan.  A sufficient condition to prevent 
this is to have  𝑤𝐻 ≥
𝑚
(𝑝ℎ)2−𝑝ℎ𝑝𝑙
. However, 𝑤𝐻 =
2𝑚
(𝑝ℎ)2−(𝑝𝑙)2
=
2𝑚
(𝑝ℎ−𝑝𝑙)(𝑝ℎ+𝑝𝑙)
>
𝑚
𝑝ℎ(𝑝ℎ−𝑝𝑙)
=
𝑚
(𝑝ℎ)2−𝑝ℎ𝑝𝑙
 and, thus, the constraint does not bind. 
The bank’s per loan credit expansion ability under pooling and tranching is given by: 
 𝐶𝑃𝑇 =
 2𝑅𝐿+(1−(1−𝑝ℎ)
2)(𝑉−𝑅𝐿)+(𝑝ℎ)
2(𝑉−?̂?𝐻−𝑅𝐿)
2
= (1 + 𝑚) −
(𝑝ℎ)
2𝑚
(𝑝ℎ)2−(𝑝𝑙)2
.                  (17) 
The three terms on the numerator after the first equality are equal to the bank’s revenues from 
the sale of securities 𝑊𝐶
0, 𝑊𝐼
𝐿 and 𝑊𝐼
𝐻, respectively, created from the pooling of the payoffs 
of two loans. The proof is completed by following the same steps as for the case when project 
returns are perfectly correlated.        □ 
In the statement of the proposition 𝑑𝑃𝑇 captures the skin in the game under the new 
arrangement which I can use to identify the benefits of pooling and tranching as reflected in 
the ability of the bank to further increase credit expansion. 
Proposition 8: (a) 𝑑𝑆 > 𝑑𝑃𝑇, and (b) 𝐸𝑇
𝑃𝑇 − 𝐸𝑇
𝑆 > 0. 
Proof: (a) 
(𝑝ℎ)
2
((𝑝ℎ)2−(𝑝𝑙)2)
= (
𝑝ℎ
𝑝ℎ−𝑝𝑙
) (
𝑝ℎ
𝑝ℎ+𝑝𝑙
) > (
𝑝ℎ
𝑝ℎ−𝑝𝑙
). (b) It follows after comparing (12) and 
(15).             □ 
The intuition for the above result is that pooling and tranching concentrate the bank’s payoffs 
on those states where the incentives for monitoring are the strongest. The securitization 
arrangement that is optimal when project returns are perfectly correlated is not optimal when 
the same returns are imperfectly correlated as it offers a payoff to the bank on those states 
where only one project is successful. Under the new arrangement the bank receives a payoff 
only in state H (when both projects succeed). 
 Up to this point, I have demonstrated that when projects returns are not perfectly 
correlated pooling and tranching strictly dominates any arrangement that does not pool 
projects payoffs together. Next, I derive the sharing rule for loan payoffs that maximizes the 
bank’s final equity and then show under what conditions it can be implemented by pooling 
and tranching. 
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 6.3. Optimality of Pooling and Tranching 
Without any loss of generality, I shall ignore leverage and, thus, assume that the bank 
shares the loan payoffs only with investors. Let 𝑢𝑗
𝑖, where 𝑖 = 𝐼, 𝐼𝐼 and 𝑗 = 𝐻, 𝐼, 𝐼𝐼, 𝐿, be non-
negative real numbers denoting the bank’s payoff form the loan repayment of project 𝑖 in 
state 𝑗. These payoffs must satisfy the following constraints: 
 𝑢𝐿
𝐼 ≤ 𝑅𝐿 , 𝑢𝐿
𝐼𝐼 ≤ 𝑅𝐿 , 𝑢𝐼𝐼
𝐼 ≤ 𝑅𝐿 ,  𝑢𝐼
𝐼𝐼 ≤ 𝑅𝐿 , 𝑢𝐼
𝐼 ≤ 𝑉,  𝑢𝐼𝐼
𝐼𝐼 ≤ 𝑉,  𝑢𝐻
𝐼 ≤ 𝑉,  𝑢𝐻
𝐼𝐼 ≤ 𝑉       (18)    
The objective is to choose 𝑢𝑗
𝑖 to maximize the bank’s profits (which are proportional to credit 
expansion) subject to the participation constraint of investors, the set of inequalities (18) and 
the incentive compatibility constraints that ensure that the bank has an incentive to monitor 
the projects. Given that investors make zero profits in equilibrium and credit expansion is 
inversely related to the bank’s share of loan payoffs, the above objective is equivalent to 
choosing 𝑢𝑗
𝑖 to minimize the bank’s expected payoff subject to (18) and the incentive 
compatibility constraints: 
 𝑀𝑖𝑛{(𝑝ℎ)
2(𝑢𝐻
𝐼 + 𝑢𝐻
𝐼𝐼) + 𝑝ℎ(1 − 𝑝ℎ)(𝑢𝐼
𝐼 + 𝑢𝐼𝐼
𝐼 + 𝑢𝐼
𝐼𝐼 + 𝑢𝐼𝐼
𝐼𝐼) + (1 − 𝑝ℎ)
2(𝑢𝐿
𝐼 + 𝑢𝐿
𝐼𝐼)} 
 subject to: 
 (𝑝ℎ)
2(𝑢𝐻
𝐼 + 𝑢𝐻
𝐼𝐼) + 𝑝ℎ(1 − 𝑝ℎ)(𝑢𝐼
𝐼 + 𝑢𝐼𝐼
𝐼 + 𝑢𝐼
𝐼𝐼 + 𝑢𝐼𝐼
𝐼𝐼) + (1 − 𝑝ℎ)
2(𝑢𝐿
𝐼 + 𝑢𝐿
𝐼𝐼) − 𝑚 ≥  
 𝑝ℎ𝑝𝑙(𝑢𝐻
𝐼 + 𝑢𝐻
𝐼𝐼) + 𝑝ℎ(1 − 𝑝𝑙)(𝑢𝐼
𝐼 + 𝑢𝐼𝐼
𝐼 + 𝑢𝐼
𝐼𝐼 + 𝑢𝐼𝐼
𝐼𝐼) + (1 − 𝑝ℎ)(1 − 𝑝𝑙)(𝑢𝐿
𝐼 + 𝑢𝐿
𝐼𝐼) 
                  (19) 
 and 
 (𝑝ℎ)
2(𝑢𝐻
𝐼 + 𝑢𝐻
𝐼𝐼) + 𝑝ℎ(1 − 𝑝ℎ)(𝑢𝐼
𝐼 + 𝑢𝐼𝐼
𝐼 + 𝑢𝐼
𝐼𝐼 + 𝑢𝐼𝐼
𝐼𝐼) + (1 − 𝑝ℎ)
2(𝑢𝐿
𝐼 + 𝑢𝐿
𝐼𝐼) − 2𝑚 
≥ 
 (𝑝𝑙)
2(𝑢𝐻
𝐼 + 𝑢𝐻
𝐼𝐼) + 𝑝𝑙(1 − 𝑝𝑙)(𝑢𝐼
𝐼 + 𝑢𝐼𝐼
𝐼 + 𝑢𝐼
𝐼𝐼 + 𝑢𝐼𝐼
𝐼𝐼) + (1 − 𝑝𝑙)
2(𝑢𝐿
𝐼 + 𝑢𝐿
𝐼𝐼)      (20) 
Constraint (19) ensures that the bank does not have an incentive to monitor only one project. 
Although, in principle, there are two such constraints, symmetry implies that they are 
identical. Constraint (20) ensures that the bank does not have an incentive not to monitor at 
all. Linearity implies that if (20) is satisfied so is (19). Symmetry also implies that 𝑢𝐻
𝐼 =
𝑢𝐻
𝐼𝐼 = 𝑢𝐻, 𝑢𝐼
𝐼 = 𝑢𝐼
𝐼𝐼 = 𝑢𝐼, 𝑢𝐼𝐼
𝐼 = 𝑢𝐼𝐼
𝐼𝐼 = 𝑢𝐼𝐼 and 𝑢𝐿
𝐼 = 𝑢𝐿
𝐼𝐼 = 𝑢𝐿. Furthermore the inequality 
𝑝ℎ > 𝑝𝑙 implies that it is optimal to set 𝑢𝐿 = 0. The above arguments imply that the 
optimization problem can be simplified to: 
 𝑀𝑖𝑛{(𝑝ℎ)
22𝑢𝐻 + 𝑝ℎ(1 − 𝑝ℎ)(𝑢𝐼 + 𝑢𝐼𝐼)}  
subject to: 
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(𝑝ℎ)
22𝑢𝐻 + 𝑝ℎ(1 − 𝑝ℎ)(𝑢𝐼 + 𝑢𝐼𝐼) − 2𝑚 ≥ (𝑝𝑙)
22𝑢𝐻 + 𝑝𝑙(1 − 𝑝𝑙)(𝑢𝐼 + 𝑢𝐼𝐼) 
Given that  (𝑝ℎ)
2 −  (𝑝𝑙)
2 > 𝑝ℎ(1 − 𝑝ℎ) − 𝑝𝑙(1 − 𝑝𝑙), if at the optimum 𝑢𝐻 < 𝑉 then 
𝑢𝐼 = 𝑢𝐼𝐼 = 0. Then, the following proposition describes the optimum sharing arrangement 
between the bank and its investors: 
Proposition 9:   
i) If 
𝑚
(𝑝ℎ)2− (𝑝𝑙)2
≤ 𝑉 then 𝑢𝐻 =
𝑚
(𝑝ℎ)2− (𝑝𝑙)2
 and 𝑢𝐼 + 𝑢𝐼𝐼 = 0, and 
ii) if 
𝑚
(𝑝ℎ)2− (𝑝𝑙)2
> 𝑉 then 𝑢𝐻 = 𝑉 and 𝑢𝐼 + 𝑢𝐼𝐼 =
2(((𝑝ℎ)
2−(𝑝𝑙)
2)𝑉−𝑚)
𝑝𝑙(1−𝑝𝑙)−𝑝ℎ(1−𝑝ℎ)
 
In order for preserve the bank’s incentives to monitor, the optimal contract requires the bank 
to keep some securities on its books. However, doing so reduces its ability to expand credit 
and therefore optimality also requires that the skin in the game is minimized. This is 
achieved, if feasible, by restricting the bank to receiving a payoff only in the high-risk state.  
Proposition 10: 
 If 
2𝑚
(𝑝ℎ)2− (𝑝𝑙)2
≤ 𝑉 − 𝑅𝐿 then the optimum can be implemented by pooling and tranching 
where  𝑤𝐻 =
2𝑚
(𝑝ℎ)2− (𝑝𝑙)2
. 
The proposition follows directly from Table 1. Notice that 𝑤𝐻 = 2𝑢𝐻. This is because 𝑢𝐻 is 
equal to the optimal bank payoff from each loan in state 𝐻 but under pooling and tranching 
the bank receives a payoff form only one of the loans and therefore it needs to be doubled to 
yield the same expected payoff.  
The reason that the condition is not necessary is because even when the inequality is 
not satisfied, it might be still possible to partially implement the optimal solution by pooling 
and tranching. In order to increase the bank’s payoff in state 𝐻 so as to ensure it will monitor 
its loan portfolio the payoff of the safe security must be reduced. But for the latter to remain 
riskless, its payoffs in all states must be reduced by the same amount. Now additional 
securities will be created by the residual payoffs in all remaining states.  
According to the pooling and tranching arrangement analyzed in this part of the paper, 
the bank keeps on its books the low risk tranche (security 𝑊𝐶
0) that posts as collateral and a 
portion of the high-risk trance (security 𝑊𝐵
𝐻) as skin in the game. These retention strategies 
are consistent with the practices that banks followed prior to the 2008 crisis (Acharya et al., 
2009; Acharya and Schnabl, 2009). 
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7. Signalling versus Monitoring: Project Quality and the Skin in the Game 
There is quite a lot of empirical work on securitization related to moral hazard and 
adverse selection issues and the evidence is mixed. The empirical works by Berndt and Gupta 
(2009) and Elul (2009) suggest that securitization has a detrimental effect on loan quality but 
it cannot discriminate between the causes, namely, between moral hazard and adverse 
selection. The studies by An et al. (2009) and Downing et al. (2009) provide empirical support 
for the adverse selection interpretation. In contrast, Keys et al. (2009) present evidence that is 
consistent with the presence of moral hazard in the subprime loan market (lack of screening 
and monitoring) but not with “strategic adverse selection”. That term refers to the ability of 
banks to select the quality of the loans they offer for sale to investors. This is in addition to 
those arising from asymmetric information. Most of this work uses data from mortgage-
backed securities. Benmelech et al. (2010) analyzing collateralized loan obligations find that 
syndication significantly reduces adverse selection concerns. 
Another way of testing the monitoring and the signalling models is to use their 
predictions about the relationship between loan quality and the skin in the game. Up to this 
point, I have assumed that the return distribution of all projects is identical. Now, I relax this 
assumption in order to consider how the quality of the project affects the skin in the game, 
that is, the portion of the corresponding loan that the bank keeps on its books. To keep the 
analysis simple, I consider the case of perfect correlation of returns so that there is no 
pooling. From (12) the skin in the game is given by: 
 𝑑𝑆 =
𝑝ℎ𝑚
(𝑝ℎ−𝑝𝑙)(1+𝑚)
.                             (16)  
Better project quality can be captured by either a higher 𝑝ℎ or a lower 𝑝𝑙. In Tirole’s (2006) 
interpretation either of these changes leads to a reduction in agency costs; put differently, 
there are stronger incentives to monitor better quality projects. Clearly, (16) implies that the 
skin in the game should increase as project quality deteriorates. 
 In contrast, DeMarzo and Duffie (1999) find that when the bank has superior 
information about project quality the skin in the game rises as project quality improves. In 
their model the bank, by showing a willingness to keep a higher fraction of the securities on 
its books, signals that the underlying assets are of better quality.  
There are a couple of papers that look directly at the relationship between loan quality 
and the skin and the game (Chen et al. 2008; Demiroglu and James, 2012). Both find that the 
skin in the game decreases as quality improves a finding consistent with the present model. 
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8. Conclusions 
 The goal of this paper is to provide a simple model that captures the practices that 
modern banks employ to expand credit and thus profitability. It is well understood now that 
many banks that adopted such practices have been principal players in the recent financial 
turmoil. But one point that this paper emphasizes is that financial innovation is not 
necessarily responsible for the crisis. By pooling and tranching the payoffs of various types 
of loans banks have created securities of different risk classes and expanded their activities 
either by selling these securities to investors or using them as collateral. With a simple model, 
I have shown how the banks can mitigate moral hazard by using pooling and tranching and 
that this leads to a decline in the skin in the game and thus credit expansion. I have also 
shown that the same process creates low-risk securities that lenders are willing to accept as 
collateral.  
 In addition to creating incentives for banks to either screen or monitor their clients, 
securitization also generates asymmetries in information about loan quality between banks on 
one hand and lenders and investors on the other. To keep things simple in my model the low-
risk tranche is riskless. The model can be easily extended to allow for some risk. As long as 
the risk level is below the maximum risk that lenders are willing to take, then banks can still 
post the low-risk securities as collateral. Within this extended version, where default becomes 
possible, it would be straightforward to show that, as the quality of the collateral deteriorates, 
lenders would require a larger haircut. One additional complication of risky debt is that both 
the pricing of debt and the level of the ‘haircut’ will be affected if lenders are risk averse.18 
 In the model developed in this paper, as in Shleifer and Vishny (2010), banks do not 
rely on deposits to finance their activities and, therefore, there is not any role for government 
policy that targets the welfare of depositors. There is no doubt that an increase in the 
complexity of financial products can exacerbate problems related to asymmetric information. 
But it is important to separate those aspects of financial innovation that aim to mitigate 
agency problems in financial markets from those that do not. 
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18
 See Geanakoplos and Zame (2009) for a general equilibrium treatment of collateral and default when 
investors are risk-averse. Simsek (2013) demonstrates that by allowing for disagreements related to the value of 
the collateral, the model can account for both the emergence of new complex contracts and the behaviour of 
asset prices before the recent crisis. 
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Figure 1: Time Line of the Model 
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Table 1: Project Return Distribution 
 
State of the World Outcome Probability 
𝐻 All projects succeed (𝑝ℎ)
2 
𝐼 Only type 𝐼 projects succeed 𝑝ℎ(1 − 𝑝ℎ) 
𝐼𝐼 Only type 𝐼𝐼 projects succeed 𝑝ℎ(1 − 𝑝ℎ) 
𝐿 All projects fail (1 − 𝑝ℎ)
2 
 
Table 2: Payoffs of Tranches 
 
 State-Contingent Payoffs 
Security 𝐻 𝐼 𝐼𝐼 𝐿 
𝑊𝐶
0 2𝑅𝐿 2𝑅𝐿 2𝑅𝐿 2𝑅𝐿 
𝑊𝐼
𝐿 𝑉 − 𝑅𝐿 𝑉 − 𝑅𝐿 𝑉 − 𝑅𝐿 0 
𝑊𝐼
𝐻 𝑉 − 𝑤𝐻 − 𝑅𝐿 0 0 0 
𝑊𝐵
𝐻 𝑤𝐻 0 0 0 
 
 
